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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
VERNON v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.: 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER MAY 
INVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE'S RELIGIOUS 
BELIEFS TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
BELIEFS AFFECT JOB PERFORMANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et al.,l the Ninth Circuit 
held that the city of Los Angeles' investigation of its assistant 
police chiefs religious beliefs did not violate his state or federal 
civil rights. 2 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In November of 1991, Robert L. Vernon, a thirty-eight year 
veteran3 of the Los Angeles Police Department (hereinafter 
"LAPD"), held the position of Assistant Chief of Police.' Since 
1984, Vernon has also served as an elder for the Grace Com-
munity Church (hereinafter "the Church"), a fundamentalist 
religious organization located in Sun Valley, California.5 
1. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) (per 
Fletcher, J., joined by Nelson, J., and Will, J., District Judge for the N.D. of Ill., 
sitting by designation). 
2. Id. at 1388. 
3. Appellant's Brief at 6, Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th 
Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994). 
4. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994). In 1991 
as Assistant Chief of Police of the LAPD, Vernon was second in command to Chief 
of Police, Daryl Gates, and was responsible for eighty-five percent of operations for 
the LAPD police force. Id. 
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On May 5, 1991, an article in the Los Angeles Magazine 
criticized Vernon's involvement in the Church.6 Quoting from 
audio tapes Vernon had made for the Church fifteen years 
earlier, the article portrayed Vernon as a man who condemned 
homosexuality, depicted police officers as "ministers of God," 
and admonished men to "recognize the concepts of disciplining 
followers, whether it be your son, employees or anyone under 
your control-your wife."7 
After the publication of the article, Defendant Zev 
Yaroslavsky, a city councilman responsible for the LAPD, met 
with Michael Yamaki, a Los Angeles police commissioner.s 
Both men agreed to conduct an investigation to determine 
whether Vernon's religious beliefs had improperly affected his 
job performance.9 Defendant Stanley Sheinbaum, a Los Angel-
es police commissioner, then publicly questioned whether 
Vernon still held the alleged views and whether those views 
were affecting his job performance. 10 
members. John Dart, Pastor's Blunt Words Roil Christian Waters, L.A. TIMES, Sep· 
tember 6, 1991, at B 1. 
6. The Dan Quayle Principle Strikes Again, Los ANGELES MAGAZINE, May 21, 
1991, at 28. The article was one item in a one page layout entitled "Trends and 
Talk in Town." (One newspaper described the magazine section as a "local gossip 
column." Sally Ann Stewart, LA's Deputy Chief Has Troubles, Too, U.S.A. TODAY, 
May 28, 1991, at 2A). The Los Angeles Magazine is a regional periodical published 
monthly with a circulation of approximately 173,000. BILL KATZ AND LINDA 
STERNBERG KATZ, Magazines for Libraries, 267 (R.R. Bowker, publ., 7th Ed. 1992). 
7. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388. See Sally Ann Stewart, supra note 6, at 2A. The 
audio tapes quoted from were part of a six·part series endorsed by the Church 
and taught by Vernon in a religious class; the tapes were entitled "The True Mas· 
culine Role." Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388. 
8. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388. This meeting occurred on May 22, 1991, at a city 
council meeting to confirm Michael Yamaki as a police commissioner. Id. 
9. Id. at 1389. Yaroslavsky had allegedly uncovered evidence suggesting that: 
(1) Vernon had made an unauthorized investigation of Chief of Police Daryl Gates 
because "God wants me to be chief;" (2) Vernon was unfair in his hiring and pro-
moting practices, and advanced church members before others; (3) Vernon was 
known as a "bible thumper" and head of the LAPD "God Squad;" (4) Vernon had 
been influenced by his religious beliefs when dealing with issues of abortion, ho-
mosexuality and female officers within the LAPD; (5) Vernon pressured officers to 
attend church services; and (6) Vernon used religious symbols in official LAPD 
correspondence. Id. Vernon's lawyer denied, among other things, that Vernon said 
anything about God wanting him to be chief. Bill Boyarsky, The Battle Within the 
LAPD, L.A. TIMES, February 7, 1992, at B 2. 
10. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1389. This public questioning occurred on May 25, 
1991. Id. 
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Yaroslavsky sent a letter listing his allegations to Defen-
dant Melanie Lomax, acting President of the Board of Police 
Commissioners (hereinafter "the Board"), requesting an inves-
tigation.11 Yaroslavsky then released this letter to the 
press.12 
On June 4, 1991, the Board voted unanimously to request 
an investigation into Yaroslavsky's allegations. 13 The Board 
sent a memorandum to Police Chief Daryl Gates which stated 
in part: "[The] Board wishes only to ensure that Chief Vernon's 
personal beliefs have not created any adverse impact on any 
job-related matters and that he has not violated any Depart-
ment policies or procedures."14 
As a result of the Board's memorandum, Chief Gates be-
gan an investigation.15 According to Gates, the investigation 
focused entirely on Vernon's on-duty conduct.16 On November 
26, 1991, after a five-month probe, the investigation was termi-
nated and the Board took no further action with respect to the 
allegations concerning Vernon. 17 
Between May 1991 and the filing of the complaint, approx-
imately 33 articles concerning the investigation of Vernon 
appeared in many prominent national newspapers and periodi-
cals. ls On at least one occasion, information concerning the 
11. Id. In the letter, Yaroslavsky wrote that Vernon was "entitled to his per-
sonal religious and political views . . . However, when one's views interfere with 
one's ability to perform official duties fairly ... it is no longer a personal matter, 
but a matter of public policy. Allegations ... deserve to be reviewed." Id. 
12. Id. Yaroslavsky released the letter on May 3, 1991. Yamaki then released 
the letter to the press. Vernon responded by appearing on a local news station 
stating that, "[D)iscriminating against anyone because of their religious beliefs is 
against the law and deprives them of their civil rights." Appellant's Brief at 10, 
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994). 
13. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1389. Both Sheinbaum and Lomax made public state-
ments. For example, Sheinbaum stated that it bothered him that "some allegations 
do claim [his religious beliefl has impacted on his role as Assistant Police Chief." 
Id. 
14. Id. at 1390. 
15. Id. During the five months of investigation, the contents of the investiga-
tion were not disclosed to Vernon or to the public. Id. 
16. Id. The court notes that "apparently no specific inquiry was made into 
Vernon's religious beliefs." Id. 
17. Id. at 1390. Chief Gates formally reported to the Board that none of the 
allegations could be substantiated. Id. 
18. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Vernon Granted Trial on Claim He 18 Victim of 
3
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investigation was televised on a nationally syndicated talk 
show.19 
On November 4,1991, Vernon filed an action in Los Angel-
es District Court against the City of Los Angeles, the City 
Council, the Board, Yaroslavsky, Sheinbaum, Brewer, and 
Lomax, claiming that the government's investigation had vio-
lated his First Amendment right to freedom of religious be-
lief.20 Vernon alleged that the pre-investigation activities and 
the investigation itself violated his federal constitutional rights 
under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
First Amendment,21 the Due Process22 and Equal 
Protection23 Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Arti-
cle I, Section 4 of the California Constitution.24 
Furthermore, Vernon claimed that the actions of the de-
Religious Bias, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at B3. Sally Ann Stewart, LA. 's Deputy 
Chief Has Troubles, Too, U.S.A. TODAY, May 28, 1991, at 2A. Garry Abrams, Don't 
Pack God in Your Lunch Box, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 1991, at D3. Associated 
Press, No. 2 L.A. Cop Faces Scrutiny for Preaching Views on Women, Gays Prompt 
Call for Probe, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1991, at A25. David Freed, 'Born-Again' 
Christians Who Also Carry a Badge, Piety in the Ranks Raises Concern in LAPD, 
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1987, at B 1. 
19. Sheinbaum appeared on the nationally televised talk show "Geraldo" to 
discuss information regarding the investigation. Appellant's Brief at 15 n.5, Vernon 
v. City of Los Angeles, et al., 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994). 
20. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). Vernon 
asked for relief in the amount of ten million dollars. See, Bill Boyarsky, The Battle 
Within the LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at B2. See also, Andrea Ford, Vernon 
Loses Injunction Try in Flap Over Religion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at B3. The 
attorney hired by Vernon, David Casterline, had successfully defended against a 
Wisconsin law that required members of the Amish Church to send their children 
to public school after the eighth grade. The case was a landmark one in the area 
of freedom of religion and constitutional law. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are 
found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects persons from unfair procedural, state actions. 
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. This clause requires that persons under like cir-
cumstances be given equal protection in the enjoyment of personal rights and the 
prevention and redress of wrongs. 
24. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4. Article 1, section 4 of the California Constitution 
provides for the free exercise and enjoyment of religion. 
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fendants caused him extreme embarrassment, anxiety, and 
fear.25 He also asserted that he had been prevented from the 
exercise of his religious beliefs, and alleged damage to his 
personal and professional reputation.26 
The district court denied Vernon's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, and later granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety.27 The claims against 
Yaroslavsky were dismissed on grounds of absolute legislative 
immunity.28 The court dismissed the claims against Brewer, 
stating that his alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.29 As to the free exercise claims 
against all defendants, the court found that Vernon failed to 
both allege or prove a constitutionally cognizable injury.3o As 
to the Establishment Clause claims, the court found no triable 
issue of material fact, finding that the investigation passed the 
"Lemon Test."31 Furthermore, the court found that the city's 
actions were justified by a compelling state interest and were 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.32 The court also dis-
missed the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause claims.33 
Finally, the court dismissed the claims under Article I of 
25. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1390. 
26. Id. Vernon claimed that the investigation affected his worship, consultation 
with his pastor, participation in Christian fellowship, and giving public testimony 
to his faith without severe consequences. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally have 
qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their 
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are 
alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), on remand 
724 F.Supp. 654 (1989), affd 922 F.2d 433 (1990). 
29. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1390. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1391. The "Lemon Test" was first enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971). Generally, the test is a three-part method of determining 
whether the government is violating the Establishment Clause. Id. See infra notes 
45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "Lemon Test." 
32. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391. A compelling state interest is one which the 
state is forced or obliged to protect. Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d 530, 534 
(Ohio 1972). Protecting against excessive state entanglement with religion has been 
held to be a compelling state interest. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. 
of Virginia, 18 F.3d 269, 287 (4th Cir. 1994). A narrowly tailored action is one 
which is does not unduly affect interests other than the interest which the action 
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the California Constitution, stating that the analysis would not 
differ from that of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause claims under the Federal Constitution since in this 
particular instance state and federal law were coextensive.34 
Vernon appealed on all claims.35 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS THE BASIS FOR FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION 
The basic premises of freedom of religion are found in the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Two dis-
tinct clauses of the First Amendment protect religious free-
dom.36 One is the Establishment Clause, which prohibits any 
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "37 The other is 
the Free Exercise Clause, which bans laws "prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion. "38 
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
combine to protect the freedom of individuals to worship or not 
worship as they wish, without governmental interference that 
might encourage or discourage religion.39 Both clauses are 
made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.40 
34: [d. The District Court found it unnecessary to address separately Vernon's 
state constitutional rights. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. 
39. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Free Exercise Clause was first held applica-
ble to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Establish-
ment Clause was first held applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), rehr'g denied 330 U.S. 855 (1947). See, NOWAK AND Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1157 n.2 (4th ed. 1991). 
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1. The Establishment Clause: The Wall Between Church and 
State 
The Establishment Clause prohibits laws "respecting an 
establishment of religion.,,41 It is this clause which is said to 
create the "wall" between church and state.42 In Everson v. 
Board of Education, the Court elaborated on what types of 
governmental actions would clearly violate the Establishment 
Clause.43 The Court stated that government may not (1) set 
up an official church; (2) force or influence a person to profess 
a belief or disbelief in religion; (3) punish a person for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs; (4) prefer 
one religion over another; or (5) participate in the affairs of 
religious organizations.44 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court applied a three-part test 
to determine whether the government was violating one of the 
above Establishment Clause prohibitions.45 The governmental 
action must satisfy each of following conditions to be valid: (1) 
it must have a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect must 
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must not foster 
excessive government entanglement.46 
2. The Free Exercise Clause: Freedom to Believe, Freedom to 
Act 
The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from mak-
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
42. This "strict separation theory" attributed to Thomas Jefferson was accepted 
by both the majority and the dissenters in Everson, which upheld publicly funded 
transportation for parochial school pupils along with others. See generally, LAw-
RENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1166 (Foundation Press, 2nd Ed. 
1988), which further notes that "The very fact that Justices who agreed on the 
governing principle could divide so sharply on the result suggests that the princi-
ple evoked by the image of a wall furnishes less guidance than metaphor." See 
also Everson, 330 U.S. at 14. 
43. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 15 (1947). 
44. ld. 
45. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602, 612 (1971). 
46. ld. See NowAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 851 (3d ed. 
1986) in which the authors infer a fourth requirement that the governmental ac-
tion must not create an excessive degree of political division along religious lines. 
The authors elaborate on the fourth condition by noting that it seems to be simply 
an aspect of the requirement of no "excessive entanglement." 
7
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ing any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.47 In 
practice, the Supreme Court has invalidated very few govern-
ment actions on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause.48 
The Free Exercise Clause strictly forbids the outlawing of 
any religious belief, but is ambiguous as to what types of con-
duct it may not prohibit.49 Generally, when a government ac-
tion negatively affects a particular type of conduct which has 
been dictated by an individual's religion, that act violates the 
Free Exercise Clause.5o Furthermore, where the statute is not 
motivated by an intent to interfere with religiously-related 
conduct, but the statute nonetheless has that effect, the Court 
has applied a test of heightened scrutiny.51 This means that 
the state, as defendant, must demonstrate first, that the regu-
lation pursues a particularly important governmental goal, and 
second, that an exemption would substantially hinder the ful-
fillment of that goa1.52 This constitutional principle has been 
named the "Burdensome Effect" test. 53 
Currently, when state regulations have the unintended 
effect of burdening religious beliefs, the court will uphold such 
laws only when they are the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing a compelling state objective.54 In particular, where 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. V. Smith, 742 
F.2d 193, on remand 698 F.Supp. 1342 (5th Cir. 1984) for a detailed explication of 
the generalization, "freedom to believe, freedom to act." 
48. ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 519 (2d ed. 
1986). 
49. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (stating that the freedom 
of individual belief is absolute, but the freedom of individual conduct is not). See 
also Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 240 (4th 
Cir. 1984), appeal after remand 789 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1986). 
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a law 
that negatively affected Amish home schooling by initiating compulsory high school 
attendance). 
51. See, e.g., Ogden v. U.S., 758 F.2d 1168, 1179 (7th Cir. 1985) (using the 
traditional standard of review utilized in First Amendment challenges in a civilian 
context: a state regulation of free exercise will be subjected to strict scrutiny and 
will be upheld only if it is narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling state 
interest). 
52. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1261-62 (2d ed. 
1988). 
53. See, e.g., U.S. v. Columbus Mun. Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 228, 231 (1977) (us-
ing the term "Burdensome Effect"). 
54. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 
(1986). 
8
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the state's objective could be served as well, or almost as well, 
by granting an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are 
burdened by the regulation, such an exemption must be giv-
en.55 
The modern approach to exemptions is best seen in 
Sherbert v. Verner.56 Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was 
fired for refusing to work on Saturdays, her religion's Sab-
bath.57 All other available jobs required that she be willing to 
work on Saturdays.58 The state refused to give her unemploy-
ment compensation benefits, stating that she had declined to 
accept "suitable work when offered."59 The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that the state's refusal violated her right to 
the free exercise of her religion. 60 The Court reasoned that 
South Carolina's policy burdened Sherbert's free exercise of 
religion because it forced her to choose between receiving bene-
fits and following her religion.61 This choice placed "the same 
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a 
fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship. ~2 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that there was a discriminatory 
component to the state's action, since Sunday worshippers did 
not have to make this choice.63 
However, in order to win the suit, it was not enough that 
Sherbert prove that her free exercise rights were burdened.54 
The Court stated that Sherbert also had to prove that there 
was no compelling state interest that justified the government 
policy, and that the interest could be satisfied in a less burden-
some manner.65 In Sherbert's case, the Court found that no 
showing was made by the state that an exemption for Sabbat-
55. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
56. [d. at 398. 
57. [d. at 402. Sherbert's employer operated a textile mill. [d. at 399. 
58. [d. at 402. 
59. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
60. [d. at 410. 
61. [d. at 404. 
62. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
63. [d. 
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arians would prevent the state from achieving its objective.66 
. B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has announced its 
willingness to reexamine its positions regarding the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 
1. The Establishment Clause: A Possible Movement Toward a 
One-Part Test 
The Supreme Court may be dissatisfied with the Lemon 
three-part test and may instead move to a single, one-part 
test.67 If the Court rejects Lemon in the future, the Ninth 
Circuit's reliance on Lemon may be questionable.66 In Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Supreme Court majority opinion 
stated that the main test was whether the law "constitutes an 
endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs or of 
religion generally. "69 
Furthermore, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court was asked to 
abandon Lemon, but refused to do SO.70 The four dissenting 
Justices in Lee agreed that the three-part test should be re-
placed in favor of a test asking only whether government has 
coerced participation in, or endorsed, a sectarian observance.71 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy, author of the Lee majority opinion, 
suggested that the Court did not approve of the Lemon test, 
stating that Lee could be decided without reconsidering Lem-
66. [d. at 19. The court stated, "[n]othing we say today constrains the states 
to adopt any particular form or scheme of unemployment compensation." [d. 
67. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 17. 
70. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). The Court stated, "(T]hus 
we do not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to 
reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman." [d. Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion. [d. at 2655. Justice Souter wrote an opinion concurring in both 
the judgment and the majority opinion that was joined by Justices Stevens and 
O'Connor. [d. at 2667. Justice Blackmun with whom Stevens and O'Connor join 
also filed an opinion in the case in which he noted that nothing in this decision 
formally altered, or was inconsistent with, the Court's Establishment Clause deci-
sions during the previous two decades. [d. at 2611. 
71. See Lee, 112 S. Ct at 2652 (Scalia, J. dissenting; with whom White, J., 
Thomas, J. and Rehnquist, C.J. joined). 
10
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on.72 Justice Kennedy argued that the government conduct in 
Lee, the offering of a prayer at a public high school commence-
ment, represented official government endorsement and coer-
cion of religion.7s Justice Kennedy found that such endorse-
ment and coercion was a violation of the Establishment Clause 
no matter which standard was applied.74 Therefore, if pre-
sented with a case that could not be easily decided without 
considering the Lemon test, the majority of the Court would 
likely abandon the test.75 
2. The Free Exercise Clause: An Increased Burden for 
Plaintiffs 
Recently, the Supreme Court has increased the plaintiffs 
burden in claims alleging a violation of Free Exercise rights. 
The Court has relaxed the standard it applies in testing gov-
ernment granted exemptions76 and has given plaintiffs the 
added requirement of proving government coercion of religious 
activity.77 
a. A Possible Departure from Strict Scrutiny in the Area of 
Exemptions 
Employment Division v. Smith 78 suggests that the 
Sherbert rule, requiring exemptions to be given where feasible, 
will be dramatically cut back by the Rehnquist Court. In 
Smith, a 5-4 decision held that a generally applicable criminal 
law is automatically enforceable, apparently regardless of the 
degree of burden it causes on an individual's religious be-
liefs.79 Therefore, it follows that a governmental refusal to 
72. ld. at 2655. 
73. ld. at 2657. 
74. ld. 
75. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1; see also Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649. 
76. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
77. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
78. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
79. ld. Smith was a Native American who participated in sacramental peyote 
use. Peyote had been determined by Oregon State to be a controlled substance. ld. 
at 874. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that: (1) th~ 
Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to the cere-
monial ingestion of peyote, and (2) thus the state could, consistent with the Free 
Exercise Clause, deny claimants unemployment compensation for work-related mis-
conduct based on use of the drug. The majority wrote that "the right of free exer-
11
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grant an exemption would no longer be held to the high stan-
dard of strict scrutiny. 
Furthermore, although none of the recent cases involving 
the Free Exercise Clause have been explicitly overruled by the 
Supreme Court, it is important to note that the current Court 
has rejected the balancing test used in past decisions.so For 
example, in 1993, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.,sl 
the majority of the Court described the current Free Exercise 
Clause standard as follows: 
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicabil-
ity need not be justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest even if the law has the incidental 
effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice ... A law failing to satisfy these require-
ments [the neutrality and general applicability 
requirements] must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest and must be narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.s2 
The Lukumi Court endorsed the ruling in Smith, in which 
the Court had refused to require religiously based exemptions 
for a religiously neutral, generally applicable law prohibiting 
the use of certain drugs.83 The Lukumi Court further en-
dorsed the principle, recognized in Smith, that a law which is 
either designed to burden or suppress religious beliefs, or 
which prohibits an action solely because of its religious signifi-
cance, violates the Free Exercise Clause.84 A law that is not a 
religiously neutral law of general applicability will be subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny and the compelling interest test.S5 
In Lukumi, the unanimous Court invalidated a city ordi-
nance that prohibited certain types of animal slaughter be-
cise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes . . . 
conduct that his religion prescribes .... " [d. at 879. 
80. ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 62 (2d ed. Supp. 
1994). 
81. 113 S. Ct 2217 (1993). 
82. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226 (1993). 
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cause the Court found that the ordinance was designed solely 
to suppress a particular religious sect.86 The ordinance had 
prohibited virtually no other types of animal slaughter, except 
that used by the religious sect, and the city had not adopted 
the law until it was informed that the religious sect planned to 
conduct the slaughtering rituals within the city.87 This city 
ordinance was invalidated by the Court because the city could 
not identify any compelling interest that would require ban-
ning only the type of animal slaughter used in the religion's 
rituals.88 
Lukumi is significant because it illustrates the current 
Free Exercise Clause standard which disavows a balancing 
test, and because it constitutes a continuing endorsement of 
Smith. 
b. A New Requirement of Coercion? 
A related development concerns a possible new require-
ment of coercion when proving a violation of free exercise 
rights. It is well established that the courts will not grant an 
individual an absolute right to practice his or her religion free 
from all governmental interference.89 On the other hand, the 
government may not actively "coerce" the individual to act or 
not act religiously.90 Somewhere between these two extremes 
lies government action which does not coerce, but which none-
theless has the effect of making it much more difficult for the 
individual to practice his or her religion.91 
86. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2221. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist., 
659 F.Supp at 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), standing for the proposition that although 
there is an absolute freedom to hold religious beliefs, the freedom to act upon 
those beliefs is not absolute. See also Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. 
Trustees of Big Sandy Independent School Dist., 817 F.Supp. lit 1330 (E.D. Tex. 
1993). 
90. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700 (stating that "the GQvernment may not 
insist that [people) engage in any set form of religious observance"). 
91. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for further discussion on the 
modern resolution of these two extremes. 
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Until recently, the Supreme Court found that this "middle 
ground" government action violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.92 However, in 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cem-
etery Protective Assoc., the Supreme Court held that the federal 
government could construct a road through federal land, re-
sulting in the destruction of certain American Indians' tradi-
tional rituals, with only a slight gain to any federal interest.93 
In Lyng, the Supreme Court has implicitly ruled that the gov-
ernment may take actions which interfere with religious prac-
tice even where the governmental interest in the action is very 
weak, and the burden to the individual's practice of his religion 
is very great.94 Lyng is significant in that the concept of "coer-
cion" now appears to be central to free exercise analysis.95 
Therefore, if the individual is not being intentionally induced 
to do or not do something, there is no free exercise claim, and 
the government is not required to justify its acts. 
Notably, Brennan's dissent in Lyng contended that where 
a government action posed a "substantial and realistic threat 
of frustrating. . . religious practices," the government should 
bear the burden of "com[ing] forward with a compelling state 
interest sufficient to justify the infringement of those practic-
es.,,96 Brennan's dissent illustrates his support for retaining 
the traditional interpretation of Sherbert, namely that the 
government must justify its action by showing a compelling 
state interest that can not be satisfied in a less burdensome 
manner.97 
92. Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. at 465, "Since our recognition nearly half a centu· 
ry ago that restraints on religious conduct implicate the concerns of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, . . . we have never suggested that the protections of the guarantee 
are limited to so narrow a range of governmental burdens." 
93. [d. at 445. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Scalia. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justic-
es Marshall and Black. Justice Kennedy took no part in the proceedings. 
94. [d. at 450. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 475. 
97. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
219 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of Vernon by reiterat-
ing well-established law concerning the standard of review.98 
First, the court stated that summary judgment is appropriate 
where no genuine issues of material fact remain and. the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the evi-
dence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.99 
Second, as to any claims under California law, the court 
stated that "a federal court interpreting state law is bound by 
the decisions of the highest state court. "100 The court stressed 
that when the state court has not stated a clear rule, the feder-
al court must determine what result the highest state court 
would reach based on existing state law. 101 
Therefore, the court stated that it would view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Vernon when deciding (1) wheth-
er there existed any genuine issues of material fact; and (2) 
whether the district court properly applied the relevant sub-
stantive law. 102 
98. See Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et. aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
99. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catpett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322 (1986». 
100. [d. (citing Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 
1990». In California, the highest state court is the California Supreme Court. 
101. See Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391. See also Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 
1565, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Kirkland, 915 F.2d at 1239; Moisbergen 
v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 
(1985). 
102. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391. 
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B. CLAIMS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION: FEDERAL 
LAw APPLIED FOR LACK OF DIRECTLY APPLICABLE 
CALIFORNIA CASE LAw 
In determining whether the district court properly applied 
the relevant substantive law, the Ninth Circuit first deter-
mined whether alternative state grounds were available. loa If 
alternative state grounds are available, a court will usually 
avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims.104 If, how-
ever, the federal and state constitutional provisions are co-
extensive, the court may decide the federal claims because that 
analysis would include the state claims.l05 When state consti-
tutional provisions are more expansive in their protection, the 
court must address the state federal constitutional claims. IDS 
In Vernon, the court found no federal or state cases direct-
ly applicable. l07 Therefore, the court stated that it would ap-
ply general principles common to both federal and state consti-
tutional doctrines as they relate to the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses. IDS 
C. FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS: MERE "CHILLING OF RELIGIOUS 
BEHAVIOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL 
BURDENING 
In determining whether Vernon's Free Exercise claim 
would prevail, the Ninth Circuit asked whether Vernon's reli-
gious belief had been substantially burdened. 109 If so, the 
government's acts would violate the United States Constitu-
103. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392. 
104. [d. at 1391-92. See also Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1565 (citing Siler v. Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909»; Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 
F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985). 
105. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 
F.2d 697, 705 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992». 
106. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 
1524 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2707 (1994); Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 
1565). 
107. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392. 
108. [d. 
109. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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tion.l1O The First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion protects the "free exercise of religion."m Article I, Sec-
tion 4 of the California Constitution provides for the "Free 
exercise and enjoyment of religion. . . . Liberty of conscience 
does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with 
the peace or safety of the State."112 California case law sug-
gests that an analysis of freedom of religion claims is generally 
similar under both federal and state law.113 In fact, in 1963 
the California Supreme Court adopted the federal test enun-
ciated in Sherbert v. Verner. 114 
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court used a balancing test to 
determine whether government actions that substantially bur-
dened a religious practice were justified by a compelling state 
interest whether the government action was narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.u6 The balancing test asks whether 
there is a less discriminatory method of achieving the means, 
and whether the government actions discriminate between 
religions, or between religion and nonreligion.116 
The district court denied the free exercise claims, finding 
that the plaintiff had not established that his right to freely 
exercise his religion had been substantially burdened by the 
government's actions.1l7 The district court noted that a plain-
tiff cannot show substantial burden by merely alleging that 
government actions subjectively "chilled" his religious behav-
110. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392. 
111. [d. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying 
text for a further discussion of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
religion. 
112. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
113. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 
56-57 (Cal. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989». 
114. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963». See also 
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Cal. 1964). See also Walker v. Superior 
Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988) (applying federal balancing test and com-
pelling state interest analysis as a matter of state constitutional law), cert. denied, 
491 U.S. 905 (1989). 
115. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403). See supra notes 
56-66 and accompanying text. 
116. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1393 (citing Molko, 762 P.2d at 57). Note that this is 
almost identical to the strict scrutiny test with the added question of whether it 
discriminates between two types of classifiers. [d. 
117. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1393. 
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ior.118 
D. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS: GoVERNMENT MAy NOT 
DISAPPROVE OR APPROVE OF RELIGION 
Vernon's Establishment Clause claim contended that the 
City's investigation violated the government's constitutionally 
mandated neutrality toward religion. 119 The United States 
Constitution prohibits any law that "establishes" a religion.12o 
The California Constitution states that "the Legislature shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. ,,121 The 
California Constitution further guarantees "free exercise and 
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or prefer-
ence,,,122 and in this way is more expansive than the Federal 
Constitution. ,,123 
1. The Lemon v. Kurtzman 3-Part Analysis Applied 
The Court in Vernon began its Establishment Clause anal-
ysis by reiterating the First Amendment ideal that forbids the 
government from disapproving of a particular religion or of 
religion in general. 124 The court noted that the government 
must be neutral and may not disapprove or approve of reli-
gion.125 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court articulated the modern 
test to determine a law's constitutionality under the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.126 According to this 
test, the action must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a 
primary effect which neither advances or inhibits religion; and 
118. [d. at 1394 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972); Presbyterian 
Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989». 
119. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). 
120. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
121. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395 (citing CAL. CONST. art I, § 4). 
122. CAL. CONST. art I, § 4. 
123. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395. However, California's more expansive clause only 
applies in certain situations and doesn't apply in this particular case. See infra 
notes 143-148 and accompanying text for further elaboration on how California's 
"No Preference Clause" expands the Federal Constitution. 
124. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396. 
125. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968». See also School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). 
126. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a parallel discussion. 
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(3) not foster excessive state entanglement with religion. 127 
As to the first prong, the Ninth Circuit used its own case 
law, which states that if the action has more than one purpose, 
the action will pass constitutional muster if at least one. of the 
purposes is secular, regardless of how many purposes may be 
non-secular.128 In Vernon, the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
the United States Supreme Court has used a slightly more 
stringent approach, which requires that the primary purpose of 
the action be secular.129 However, the Ninth Circuit found 
that no matter which approach was used, the action passed the 
first prong of the test.130 
The court made this. determination by looking at 
Yaroslavsky's letter, Lomax's memorandum, the Board meet-
ing, and Chief Gates' declaration.131 Each of these items had 
at least once mentioned that the purpose of the investigation 
was to determine whether the operations and policies of the 
LAPD were being improperly compromised by Vernon.132 The 
court found that the department's fear that Vernon's religious 
beliefs might have affected his job was a valid secular purpose 
and was the primary purpose of the investigation.133 
As to the second prong of the test, the court determined 
whether the investigation could be reasonably construed as 
sending a message either endorsing or disapproving of reli-
gion.134 The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district 
court, focusing on whether the action 'primarily' disapproved of 
religious beliefs. After reviewing Yaroslavsky's letter and 
Lomax's memorandum, and the prominent disclaimers con-
tained therein, the court found that the action did not primari-
ly disapprove of religion.135 
127. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). 
128. [d. at 1397. I 
129. [d. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1991), cert de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992). 





135. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399. 
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As to the third prong of the Lemon test, the court noted 
that administrative entanglement typically involves compre-
hensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance of 
religion. 136 The Lemon test gives three factors to determine 
this prong of the test: (1) The character and purpose of the 
religious institution affected; (2) the nature of the activity that 
the government mandates; and (3) the resulting relationship 
between the government and the religious institution. 137 
The court found that Vernon failed to present a clear argu-
ment as to the first factor. 13S The government's actions were 
not directed toward the Church itself, only toward Vernon. As 
to the second factor, the court concluded that the government's 
action was closely connected to the institution's religious 
charge.139 As to the third factor, the court noted that there 
was no continuing or systematic investigation of religious be-
liefs.140 The government's investigation of Vernon was limited 
in scope, had a justifiably secular purpose, and did not require 
the government to make religious versus secular determina-
tions or to engage in ongoing monitoring. 141 
2. California's No Preference Clause is Not Applicable in 
Vernon's Establishment Clause Analysis 
In its Establishment Clause analysis, the Ninth Circuit 
noted the possible application of California's "No Preference 
Clause."142 California's "No Preference Clause" is the state's 
restatement of the United States Constitution's Establishment 
Clause.143 The court in Vernon noted that the California "No 
Preference Clause" is more expansive than the federal Estab-
lishment Clause.144 Therefore, the fact that the court applied 
federal law may have had an effect on the court's decision 
since California gives greater deference to freedom of reli-
136. [d. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-22). Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
684 (1984). See also Cammack, 932 F.2d at 781. 
137. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399 (citing Lemon; 403 U.S. at 615). 
138. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 1400. 
141. [d. at 1401. 
142. [d. 
143. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
144. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1402. 
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gion.145 
However, California's "No Preference Clause" is more ex-
pansive only insofar as it encompasses more government action 
which aids religion, not insofar as it hinders or stigmatizes 
religion; therefore, the application of either the state or federal 
law would be identical. l46 For example, Vernon did not con-
tend that the state's investigation discriminated against him 
by favoring his religion. Thus, the government's actions could 
not have violated the No Preference Clause as it is expansively 
read by California. 147 
Based on the preceding analysis, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's analysis that Vernon had failed to 
prove that the City's investigation had violated either his Free 
Exercise or Establishment Clause rights. 148 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that Vernon had failed to meet the 
threshold test of establishing that his right to freely exercise 
his religion had been substantially burdened. 149 The court 
further held that Vernon had failed to prove his claim that he 
could no longer worship or associate freely. ISO Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit found it proper, for a city to conduct an investi-
gation into the religious beliefs of its employee, when the city 
is concerned that those beliefs might affect job performance. 
Wendy L. Wilbanks' 
145. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
146. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1402. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. As to the City's claim for attorneys' fees, the Court stated that the 
same standard applies when analyzing requests for attorneys' fees at both the trial 
and appellate levels. The mere fact that a party prevails does not entitle that 
party to attorneys' fees unless it would be "unjust" not to award them. It would 
be unjust if the actions were found to be "unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or 
vexatious." The court reasoned that because none of these applied, defendants' 
attorneys' fees were denied. Id. 
149. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994). 
150. Id. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. 
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